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Abstract. This study demonstrates the ability of powerful visualization tools 
(based on the use of connectionist models) to identify network intrusion at-
tempts in an effective and reliable manner. It presents a novel technique to test 
and evaluate a previously developed network-based intrusion detection system 
(IDS). This technique applies mutant operators and is intended to test IDSs us-
ing numerical data sets. It should be made clear that some mutations were dis-
carded as they did not all provide real life situations. As an application example 
of the proposed testing model, it has been specially applied to the identification 
of network scans and mutations of these. The tested Connectionist Agent-Based 
IDS (CAB-IDS) is used as a method to investigate the traffic which travels 
along the analysed network, detecting anomalous traffic patterns. The specific 
tests performed in this study were based on the mutation of one or several vari-
ables analysed by CAB-IDS.  
1 Introduction 
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) are tools designed to monitor and analyse com-
puter system or network events in order to detect suspect patterns that may relate to a 
network or system attack. An IDS that analyses packets travelling over an entire net-
work is referred to as a network-based IDS. 
Visualization techniques are starting to be applied in the field of IDSs [1], [2], [3], 
[4], [5], [6] and they are generally applied to numeric data. However, in the field of 
Computer Security, traffic data sets normally have a categorical and/or textual nature 
and their conversion into a data type to which visualization techniques (such as scatter 
plot or projectionist models) may be applied is not always obvious. Previous attempts 
are presented in [1], [4], [5], [6]. 
 IDS evaluation is not a clear cut task [7]. Previous works have presented several 
techniques to test and evaluate misuse detection models for network-based IDSs. 
Some of these techniques were based [8] on a mechanism that generates a large num-
ber of variations on a known exploit by applying mutant operators to its template. In 
this study, a method is proposed to apply such a mutation technique for visualization 
techniques using numerical data sets. 
In this case, the method is used to analyse the response of CAB-IDS (Connectionist 
Agent-Based IDS) [4], [5], [6] in the detection of a network scan. The ability to detect 
such scans can help to identify wider and potentially more dangerous threats to a 
network. The main advantage of this testing model is that it allows analysis of IDSs 
based on numerical data sets.  
A port scan may be defined as series of messages sent to different port numbers to 
gain information on its activity status. These messages can be sent by an external 
agent attempting to access a host to find out more about the network services this host 
is providing. A port scan provides information on where to probe for weaknesses, for 
which reason scanning generally precedes any further intrusive activity. This work 
focuses on the identification of network scans, in which the same port is the target for 
a number of computers. A network scan is one of the most common techniques used 
to identify services that might then be accessed without permission [3]. 
The principal research interest and novelty of this work lies in the development of 
a testing method. The main goal of this method is to prove the effectiveness and ca-
pability of any IDS based on numerical data to confront unknown attacks. In this 
particular study it has been used to test CAB-IDS. 
2 CAB-IDS 
CAB-IDS (Connectionist Agent-Based Intrusion Detection System) is a tool that has 
previously been described [4], [5] and can be defined as an IDS formed of different 
software agents [9] that work in unison [6] in order to detect anomalous situations by 
taking full advantage of an unsupervised connectionist model. 
To detect anomalous situations, CAB-IDS consists of different kinds of agents: 
− Sniffer Agent (S-A): this type of agent "controls" each segment (in which the net-
work is divided).  
− IDS Agent (IDS-A): there is only one agent of this kind, which is in charge of 
processing the information sent by S-As and alerting the network administrator. 
 
The different functions performed by these agents are: 
− 1st step.- Network Traffic Capture: captures packets travelling over the network 
segments where S-As are located. 
− 2nd step.- Data Pre-processing: the captured data is selected, pre-processed and sent 
to the IDS-A. A set of packets and features contained in the headers of the captured 
data is selected from the raw network traffic. 
− 3rd step.- Data Analysis: once the IDS-A receives the pre-processed data, a connec-
tionist model (see Sect. 2.1) is applied to analyse the data and identify anomalous 
patterns. 
− 4th step.- Visualization: the projections are presented to the network administrator. 
2.1 The Unsupervised Connectionist Model 
The data analysis task performed by the IDS-A is based on the use of a neural Ex-
ploratory Projection Pursuit (EPP) [10], [11] model called Cooperative Maximum 
Likelihood Hebbian Learning (CMLHL) [12], [13], [14]. It was initially applied in the 
field of Artificial Vision [12], [13] to identify local filters in space and time. In CAB-
IDS it is applied in the field of Computer Network Security. CMLHL is based on 
Maximum Likelihood Hebbian Learning (MLHL) [15], [16] adding lateral connec-
tions [12], [13] which have been derived from the Rectified Gaussian Distribution 
[17]. The resultant net can find the independent factors of a data set but does so in a 
way that captures some type of global ordering in the data set. 
Considering an N-dimensional input vector ( x ), an M-dimensional output vector 
( ) and with being the weight (linking inputy ijW j  to output ), CMLHL can be 
expressed [12], [13], [14] as:  
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Where: η  is the learning rate, τ is the "strength" of the lateral connections,  the 
bias parameter, 
b
p a parameter related to the energy function [13], [15], [16] and  a 
symmetric matrix used to modify the response to the data. The effect of this matrix is 
based on the relation between the distances among the output neurons. 
A
3 A Mutation Testing Model for Numerical Data Sets 
Testing an IDS tool is the only way to establish its effectiveness. In order to test 
CAB-IDS, it was decided to measure its results confronting unknown anomalous 
situations. Furthermore, it was decided to compare it alongside other models such as 
Principal Component Analysis (PCA) [18] or MLHL [10], [11] as no other IDS, as far 
as the authors are aware, shares similar characteristics. It is noticeable that few unsu-
pervised methods have been applied to the field of IDSs. Examples include PCA [1], 
EPP [4], [5] and Self-Organizing Maps (SOM) [19], [20]. Projectionist models such 
as PCA, EPP, MLHL or CMLHL have one important advantage over SOM in the 
field of computer network security in that they use time as a key variable when ana-
lysing the evolution of the packets in the traffic data set. 
Misuse IDSs based on signatures rely on models of known attacks. The effective-
ness of these IDSs depends on the "goodness" of their models. This is to say, if a 
model of an attack does not cover all the possible modifications, the performance of 
the IDS will be greatly impaired. 
Our mutation testing model is inspired by previous testing models [8], [21], but 
this is the first one for IDSs based on numerical data sets. In general, a mutation can 
be defined as a random change. In keeping with this idea, the testing model modifies 
different features of the numerical information extracted from the packet headers.  
The modifications created by this model may involve changes in aspects such as: 
attack length (amount of time that each attack lasts), packet density (number of pack-
ets per time unit), attack density (number of attacks per time unit) and time intervals 
between attacks. The mutations can also concern both source and destination ports, 
varying between the different three ranges of TCP/UDP port numbers: well known 
(from 0 to 1023), registered (from 1024 to 49151) and dynamic and/or private (from 
49152 to 65535). 
Time is another fascinating issue of great importance when considering intrusions 
since the chance of detecting an attack increases in relation to the duration of it. There 
are therefore two main strategies:  
• Drastically reduce the time used to perform a scan. 
• Spread the packets out over time, which is to say, reduce the number of packets 
sent per time unit that are likely to slip by unnoticed. 
It should be taken into account and will be explained further on that any of the pos-
sible mutations may be meaningless such as a sweep of less than 5 hosts in the case of 
a network scan. 
 
Several tests have been designed to verify the performance of CAB-IDS. Each test 
is related to a data set obtained by mutating the original one (see Sect. 4). Changes 
were made to the traffic related to the sweeps to take the following points into ac-
count: 
− Number of sweeps in the scan (that is, number of scanned ports). 
− Destination port numbers at which sweeps are aimed. 
− Time intervals when sweeps are performed. 
− Number of packets (density) forming the sweeps (number of scanned hosts). 
Taking these issues into account, the collection of data sets designed for the re-
search (see Sect. 4) covers the majority of the different scan-related situations with 
which a network might be confronted. Despite the fact that this technique is unable to 
provide a formal evaluation, it represents in our opinion a good approximation.  
4  Data Sets and Tests 
It was previously indicated that the proposed CAB-IDS [4], [5], [6] is able to identify 
a network scan contained in a data set with the following attributes: 
− Three different sweeps to several hosts. 
− Each sweep aimed at port numbers 161, 162 and 3750. 
− A time difference between the first and the last packet included in each sweep of 
17 866 ms for port number 161, 22 773 ms for port number 162 and 17 755 ms for 
port number 3750. 
− An MIB (Management Information Base) information transfer event. This anoma-
lous situation and its potential risks are fully described in [4], [5]. 
As previously explained, several testing data sets containing the following key fea-
tures were presented to CAB-IDS following their mutation in order to measure the 
performance of CAB-IDS: 
− Case 1 (modifying both the amount of sweeps and the destination ports): 
• Data set 1.- only one sweep: port 3750. 
• Data set 2.- two sweeps: ports 161 and 162. 
• Data set 3.- only one sweep: port 1734. 
• Data set 4.- two sweeps: ports 4427 and 4439. 
− Case 2 (modifying both time and the number of sweeps): 
• Data set 5.- three time-expanded sweeps: ports 161, 162 and 3750. 
• Data set 6.- three time-contracted sweeps: ports 161, 162 and 3750. 
• Data set 7.- one time-expanded sweep: port 3750. 
− Case 3 (modifying both the amount of packets and the destination ports): 
• Data set 8.- two 5-packet sweeps: ports 4427 and 4439. 
• Data set 9.- two 30-packet sweeps: ports 1434 and 65788. 
The first issue to consider is the amount of sweeps in the scan. Data sets containing 
1 sweep (Data sets 1, 3 and 7), 2 sweeps (Data sets 2, 4, 8 and 9) or 3 sweeps (Data 
sets 5 and 6) have been used. Each sweep is aimed at a different port number. The 
implications are crystal clear; hackers can check the vulnerability of as many ser-
vices/protocols as they want. The number of sweeps (ranging from 1 to 65 536) can 
be modified from one scan to another. 
A scan attempting to check port protocol/service can be aimed at any port number 
(from 0 to 65535). The data sets contain sweeps aimed at port numbers such as 161 
and 162 (well known ports assigned to Simple Network Management Protocol), 1434 
(registered port assigned to Microsoft-SQL-Monitor, the target of the 
W32.SQLExp.Worm), 3750 (registered port assigned to CBOS/IP ncapsalation), 4427 
and 4439 (registered ports, as yet unassigned) and 65788 (dynamic or private port). 
In order to check our system in relation to the time-related strategies, data sets 5, 6 
and 7 were used. Data set 5 was obtained by spreading the packets contained in the 
three different sweeps (161, 162 and 3750) over the captured session. In this data set, 
there is a time difference of 247 360 ms between the first (in the sweep aimed at port 
161) and the last scan packet (in the sweep aimed at port 3750). The duration of the 
captured session (all the packets contained in the data set) is 262 198 ms, whereas in 
the original data set the scan lasts 164 907 ms. In the case of data set 7, the same 
mutation has been performed but only for packets relating to the sweep aimed at port 
3750. On the other hand, the strategy of reducing the time was used to obtain data set 
6. In this case, the time difference between the first and the last packet is about 109 
938 ms. 
Finally, the number of packets contained in each sweep was also considered. In the 
case of a network scan, each packet means a different host included in the scan. Data 
sets 8 and 9 were designed with this issue in mind. Data set 8 contains low-density 
sweeps given that they have been reduced to only 5 packets. It was decided that a 
sweep scanning less than 5 hosts should not constitute a network scan. This is a fuzzy 
lower limit because it could also be set as 4 or 6 packets. On the other hand, data set 9 
contains medium-density sweeps. In this case, each one of them has been extended to 
30 packets. This is also a fuzzy upper limit. 
Apart from identifying the mutated sweeps, the detection of the MIB information 
transfer contained in all the data sets also represented a serious test for the perform-
ance of CAB-IDS. The experimental results obtained for these data sets are shown in 
the following section. 
5 Results and Comparison 
All the results were obtained by training the connectionist model for each new data 
set. The application of our model to the different scenarios (see Sect. 4) led to the 
results that are shown in Figs.1 to 6. Only figures for the most representative cases are 
presented. Through these figures, it may be seen how CAB-IDS is able to identify the 
different mutated anomalous situations, even though some are identified with greater 
clarity than others. Apart from traffic related to the scan, these figures also show 
packets interrelated with the rest of the traffic. 
Situations are labelled anomalous whenever they tend not to resemble parallel and 
smooth directions (normal situations). In Fig. 1 two anomalous situations are high-
lighted (MIB information transfer and the network scan), both identified by CMLHL. 
As previously explained in [4], [5], [6], those situations are identified by CMLHL as 
anomalous by taking account of such aspects as traffic density or "anomalous" traffic 
directions. 
Considerable experience is required to identify the sweep in the case of the projec-
tion for data set 7 (Fig. 2). Conversely, the other anomalous situation (the MIB infor-
mation transfer) is identified with far greater clarity than in any of the other cases. 
 
Fig. 1. CMLHL projection for data set 5 Fig. 2. CMLHL projection for data set 7 
 
When sweeps contain only 5 packets (Data set 8 – Fig. 3), an expert is once again 
required to identify the anomalous scan situations. On the other hand, CAB-IDS very 
clearly detects high-density sweeps (Fig. 4). 
Fig. 3.  CMLHL projection for data set 8 Fig. 4. CMLHL  projection for data set 9 
For comparison purposes, we have also applied PCA to the previous mutated data. 
As it can be seen in Fig. 5, the best PCA projection (Factor pair 1-3) is capable of 
identifying the 3-sweep scan but it is not capable of identifying the MIB information 
transfer. The projection of the two first principal components (Factor pair 1-2) ob-
tained by applying PCA is unable to detect these anomalous situations. On the other 
hand, Fig. 6 shows how CMLHL is capable of identifying both situations. 
 
Fig. 5. PCA projection for data set 6 Fig. 6. CMLHL projection for data set 6 
6 Conclusions and Future Work 
This paper has introduced a novel mutation testing model for IDSs oriented to analyse 
numerical traffic data sets. It was used to test CAB-IDS and demonstrate its ability to 
identify most of the anomalous situations it confronted. The identification of these 
mutated scans can, in broad terms, be explained by the generalization capability of the 
connectionist model applied in this work. That is to say, through the use of one of 
these models, the IDS is capable of identifying not only the real anomalous situations 
contained in the data sets (known) but also the mutated (unknown) ones which may 
be real. This generalization capability of CAB-IDS represents its main advantage over 
the majority of signature-based IDSs. Future work will be based on the application of 
new learning rules to improve CMLHL. 
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